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OILING GLOBAL CAPITAL ACCUMULATION: ANALYZING THE 
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
David Bassens, Ben Derudder, Frank Witlox 
Abstract This article focuses on the Islamic financial services (IFS) sector, which originated in 
the Middle East, but is now fast becoming a global sector. First we discuss Islamic economic 
ideology, which resulted in the foundation of IFS firms after the 1973 oil crisis. The second part 
provides an overview of the most common IFS. The third part discusses the global distribution 
of IFS firms and Shari’a compliant assets. The Middle East is at the apex of the IFS sector, with 
the Islamized economies of Iran and Pakistan and prime hubs such as Manama and Dubai. 
Outside the Middle East, Malaysia is identified as an important growing market for IFS, while 
outside the Muslim world London is increasingly profiling itself as a global IFS hub. 
1 Introduction 
Some recent trends and events in the world economy have given rise to a number of far-
reaching considerations regarding the implications of the use of some financial instruments and 
the concomitant consequences for the global economic system as a whole. For instance, the 
often speculative trading of securities and the use of numerous types of ‘exotic’ derivatives has 
seriously altered the face of international finance in the last decades. A major consequence of 
this evolution is that much of the world economy seems to have taken a virtual, highly intangible 
character. Although in principle enlarging the economic potential, this move away from the ‘real’ 
commodity-based economy has recently shown to be risk-infested to say the least. In an 
intensely integrated economy, a ‘local’ crisis can easily spread to become a malaise on a global 
scale, as is currently illustrated by the global credit-crisis following the 2008 sub-prime lending 
in the United States (Taylor et al., 2009).  
 
Parallel to these fundamental economic concerns, investors are increasingly sensitive about the 
moral implications of their investments. The fact that in recent years numerous ethical 
investment funds have arisen clearly indicates that public opinion throughout the world is 
giving a signal that profit cannot be the only goal of investments. Financial institutions have 
therefore come up with an array of funds banning investment in ‘unethical’ activities such as 
industries of weapons, tobacco, gambling, etc.  
 
Apart from the ethical dimensions of investment behaviour, moral concerns are often based 
explicitly on religious grounds, and they are by no means constraint to ‘Western’ financial 
circuits. In fact, within the Muslim world1 and especially within the Middle East, scholars and 
financial experts have since long been sensitive to both the economic and moral aspects of the 
financial system. Combining a distinct view on an interest-free economy and a clear vision on 
virtuous and prohibited investments, the Islamic financial services (IFS) sector has known a 
rapid growth since the 1970s. Although Islamic economics had been conceptualized early in the 
20th century, it was only from the 1970s onwards that the Muslim world, and especially the oil-
exporting countries in the Middle East, established the financial basis that allowed for the actual 
implementation of this rationale. Indeed, in spite of some experiments in rural areas of Egypt in 
the 1960s, the rise of IFS can be traced back to the two oil-price shocks in the 1970s2, which led  
to a massive transfer of wealth from oil-consuming to oil-producing countries, of which many 
were located in the Middle East (Akacem and Gilliam, 2002; Tripp, 2006). This excess income 
found its way in the interest-based system through ‘conventional’ banks throughout the world 
(but mainly headquartered in Europe and the United States), but it also resulted in the 
emergence of a number of new Islamic financial institutions and instruments within the region. 
Despite rather meagre results in absolute terms in the early years, the IFS sector has been 
rapidly expanding recently, with annual growth rates of 15% to 20%. This success has 
undoubtedly been fuelled by a general ‘Islamic revival’ within the Middle East. As the second oil 
shock coincided with the Iranian revolution and the emergence of the first Islamic republic, 
Islamic banking and finance increasingly came to be regarded as the ‘appropriate’ way to do 
business for Muslims seeking an alternative consistent with Islamic teaching (Akacem and 
Gilliam, 2002). Nowadays, given the overall rising trend of oil prices, the financial basis for IFS 
seems assured.  While the current IFS market is rather limited3 with an estimated size of 639 
billion US$ (The Banker, 2008: 3), Standard & Poor’s has claimed that the potential market for 
Islamic finance could be 4 trillion US$, over six times its current size (IFSL, 2008: 1).  
 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the key characteristics of the IFS sector. It is hereby our 
intention to show that the global influence of the IFS sector is rapidly growing, not only as an 
ethical niche, but also as the vanguard of a full-scale emerging market in which international 
financial centres – both in the Middle East and elsewhere – are anxiously trying to play a 
decisive role. The paper is structured as follows. In a first section we discuss the Islamic 
economic rationale and its origins. The second section provides an overview of the ways in 
which this overarching economic rationale is put to practice within the fast growing IFS sector, 
while the third section aims to locate these practices on the world map. 
 
2 The origins of Islamic financial services in Islamic economics 
While in many studies on IFS the emphasis is generally on their economic aspects, Islamic 
economics actually originated in the Muslim world as an ideological paradigm, embedded within 
a context of regional and national struggles for political power and a search for a distinct 
‘Islamic’ identity (Kuran, 1995, 1997). From the 1940s onwards, the Middle East saw the advent 
of Islamic economics as a claimed ideological alternative to existing paradigms. As Muhammad 
Baqir al-Sadr (1931–1980), a famous Iraqi Shi’i jurist saw it at the time, Islamic economics could 
be an alternative for the models of capitalism and Marxism as an entirely separate system (Ala 
Hamoudi, 2007). As a modern, all-encompassing model for social, economic, and political life, 
Islamic economics claimed to be “the Third Way” and an alternative to Western economic 
conceptions. It was thought to avoid the inegalitarian excesses of modern capitalism, while at 
the same time unleashing the energies of entrepreneurs and merchants (Hefner, 2006: 17). In 
essence, Islamic economics was aimed at freedom from colonial rule, exploitation, and 
oppression through a return to Islam, which stood for the elimination of poverty and the 
reduction of unequal distribution of wealth (Siddiqi, 2007: 99-100). 
 
However, according to other authors (e.g., Kuran, 1995), the onset of Islamic economics in itself 
was not rooted in the claimed intentions to change economic imbalances, injustices or 
inequalities. Instead, it must be framed within the specific historical situation of Indian Muslims 
in the 1940s, who wanted to defend Islamic civilization against foreign cultural influences. As 
Kuran (1997: 302, original emphasis) notes: ‘the economics of Islamic economics was merely 
incidental to its Islamic character’. For instance, the Pakistani ideologist Sayyid Abul A’la 
Maududi (1903–1979), popularized the term ‘Islamic economics’ because he saw economics as a 
vehicle for (re)establishing Islamic authority in a domain where Muslims were falling 
increasingly under the influence of Western ideas. 
 
The religious foundations for this Islamic ideological reassertion were provided by the prime 
sources of Islam i.e. the Koran and the hadiths4. These two sources are the basis of the Shari’a, 
the Right Path and the Holy Law of Muslims. In addition, Islamic reasoning is based on analogy, 
and the consensus of the Islamic religious scholars (ulama). Muslims attune their actions to the 
Shari’a, which comprises a set of ideas and rules that regulate the relation between man and God 
and between man and fellow man. As the distinction between actions that are Shari’a compliant 
(halal) and Shari’a prohibited (haram) plays a crucial role in all Muslim behaviour, it evidently 
affects all economic activities as well. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned evolutions, Islamic economics started to promote a distinct 
rationale which prohibits three aspects of conventional interest-based economics: riba 
(interest), gharar (uncertainty), and maysir (gambling) (Bassens et al., 2010). In addition, Islam 
forbids the trading and consumption of an array of products that are haram (i.e. pork meat, 
alcohol, pornography, weaponry, gambling). The first feature, the prohibition of riba (‘increase’ 
or interest) is probably the most widely known. In Islamic thought, time does not equal money. 
Since money is not considered a commodity, but rather a bearer of risk (Pollard and Samers, 
2007: 315), there is a strong belief that money should not make money by itself. In an interest-
based system, an entrepreneur borrowing money from a ‘conventional’ bank has to pay up every 
term, regardless of the profits or losses he has made. From an Islamic point of view, the fact that 
one party could earn a profit while his business project partner suffers a loss, is considered 
highly inequitable. Profit-and-loss sharing between commercial parties is therefore considered 
the alternative to the interest-based system, thus guaranteeing social harmony (Ala Hamoudi, 
2007). For instance, in the case of a loan, a money lender does not earn money simply by lending 
it to the borrower. Instead, a money lender can get an extra return in the form of a pre-agreed 
part of the profits, or take the loss by ratio of the investment. By prohibiting the raising of 
interest, the Islamic economic rationale prevents the occurrence of disproportionate losses and 
gains, thereby aiming to enhance social cohesion. 
 
Second, the prohibition of gharar is referring to acts and conditions in exchange contracts, of 
which the full implications are not clearly known to the parties and could lead to exposing one of 
the parties to unnecessary risks (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005: 14). For instance, one speaks of  
gharar if (i) the parties lack knowledge; (i) the object does not exist; or (iii) the object evades the 
parties’ control (Vogel and Hayes, 1998: 89-90). The word gharar means deception or delusion, 
but also connotes peril, risk or hazard. In financial terms, it is interpreted as ‘uncertainty, risk or 
speculation’ (Warde, 2000: 59). In essence, the prohibition on gharar rejects any gain that may 
result from chance or undetermined causes.  Therefore, there is a ban on the sale of an item that 
does not exist yet, and also on contracts with uncertainty about their cost and duration (Sanhuri, 
1967: 31, 49). Gharar thus refers to the exploitation that can arise from contractual ambiguities, 
and its prohibition therefore aims to eliminate or at least minimise this legal risk. However, the 
prohibition of gharar does not imply that literally all risks are banned:  the accepted salam 
contract, where one party provides a loan and the other party promises to procure commodities, 
is a good example of the latter (Bekkin, 2007b: 23). As the price of the commodities may drop 
after the contract was closed, some risk is inevitably transferred to the money lender. At the 
same time, however, the lender may reap the benefits of a good price if prices have gone up after 
the contract was closed. Gharar is therefore in essence about eliminating excess risk, and sharing 
entrepreneurial risk between parties in a contract. Islam does however not reject all forms of 
risk-taking: the risk one takes when investing in a project is even encouraged. As Iqbal and 
Molyneux (2005: 15) put it: 
 
“Entrepreneurial risk […] is part of the normal course of business. Every economic activity 
involves uncertainty which generates risks. Some agents, called entrepreneurs, take those 
risks. An enterprising person makes profit, and on occasion incurs losses […] Willingness to 
take such risks does not imply any moral evil; rather, it is a need that no society can do away 
with.” 
Meanwhile, the rejection of excessive risk-taking not only influences the making of a contract, 
but also highly restricts the further trading of contracts, be it via futures, options, swaps and 
other derivatives (see Naughton and Naughton, 2000). In the case of future contracts, the Islamic 
al-istisna (contract) provides means for future delivery, but only if the delivery is actually made. 
The problem with conventional futures is that the commodity is seldom (or never) delivered to 
the other party. Instead, these futures are traded on the exchange, and used for speculative 
reasons.  As for stock options, both short selling and the use of put and call options is evidently 
speculative and therefore haram. 
The third prohibition, the one of maysir, is very much related to the above-mentioned concept of 
gharar. It bans all kinds of gambling and games of chance, but equally rejects all forms of 
speculation (which can be thought of as gambling). Games are considered unnecessary for a 
person and for society as a whole, since no economic value is added to the wealth of society 
(Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005: 15). Since maysir is often related with high levels of uncertainty, the 
difference with gharar may sometimes seem relatively vague. However, whereas a degree of 
gharar is inherent to economic activities and is thus acceptable, maysir is completely banned by 
Islam. 
 
Figure 1 Combined stock evolutions of the top 10 conventional financial services firms from Octobre 1st 2006 
(100 %) until December 1st 2008 (FI: ING Group, Fortis, Citigroup, Dexia Group, HSBC Holding, BNP Paribas, 
Crédit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America Corp., UBS) and top 10 listed IFS firms (IFI: Al Rahji Bank, 
Kuwait Finance House, Dubai Islamic Bank, Blom Bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Al Baraka Banking Group, 
BIMB Holdings, Bank Alfalah, Bank Al Jazira, Qatar Islamic Bank). 
 Bearing these differences in mind, it can be expected that IFS firms – which have largely 
developed in isolation from the global interest-based financial system with all its risk-taking – 
will suffer less from global crises. This assumption seems to be correct at time of writing, as 
Figure 1 shows. The figure compares the combined stock evolution of the top 10 ‘conventional’ 
financial services firms (based on Fortune’s Global 500) with the top 10 of listed IFS firms, for 
the last two years. 
This comparison suggests that IFS firms have been substantially less affected by the fast-
spreading global financial crisis. While the leading ‘conventional’ financial stocks have dropped 
over 75%, the IFS firms’ stocks have kept 66% of their initial value. Furthermore, since last year 
the global amount of Shari’a compliant assets has risen with 27,6% (The Banker, 2008: 3).  In 
the long run, however, the IFS sector’s oil dependence could very well drag these firms further 
down. Indeed, given the high oil prices in the spring of 2008, soaring to as much as 145 US$ per 
barrel, the sector’s position had remained untouched. Now, with oil prices dropping fast towards 
the end of 2008, it is likely that the financial crisis will eventually hit the IFS sector as well. Time 
will tell if the IFS sector will turn out to be a safe haven for global investors, and a shelter for the 
global financial downturn. 
 
3 Islamic economics in practice: Islamic banking, finance and insurance 
Based on the overarching rationale of Islamic economics, a whole array of Shari’a compliant 
financial products has emerged in the last decades, predominantly in retail, although the 
wholesale Islamic finance market is also growing as IFS firms are increasingly going global. The 
next section discusses these globalization startegies in detail, here we focus on the retail side of 
the IFS sector, i.e. the products offered in the field of Islamic banking and insurance. We discuss 
two models of Islamic banking (see Table 1): while the two-tiered mudarabah model describes 
an ideal situation, the one-tiered mudarabah model is more consistent with actual practice.  
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Furthermore, this section also briefly discusses the use of ‘benevolent loans’ (Qard al-Hasanah) 
by Islamic banks and the way IFS firms organize Islamic insurance (takaful) for their customers. 
 
3.1  A Two-tiered Mudarabah as an ‘Ideal’ Islamic Banking Model 
An ideal model of Islamic banking involves a two-tier mudarabah system, implementing passive 
partnership on both liabilities and asset side. On the liabilities side of the bank, the depositors 
supply the capital for the joint stock company and in the case of investment deposits they 
become shareholders in the bank (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005: 19). Islamic banks raise their 
funds through two types of deposits: transaction deposits and investment deposits (Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1990: 354-355). Transaction deposits resemble conventional demand deposits. They 
often follow the principle of wadiah according to which the depositor agrees to deposit an asset, 
excluding immovable fixed assets, in the custody of another party that is not the owner (Sudin et 
al., 1994: 33). Although the bank guarantees the nominal value of the transaction deposit, no 
returns are paid on these liabilities. Investment deposits on the other hand constitute the 
principle source of funds. These deposits are best to be compared with conventional shares 
rather than conventional savings deposits. The bank does not guarantee their nominal value, nor 
does it pay a fixed return. Rather, the depositors are treated as shareholders of the bank, who 
are entitled to a share of the profits or losses made by the bank (Khan and Mirakhor, 1990: 354-
355).  
 
Table 1 Two models of Islamic Banking 
Liabilities Assets 
Mudarabah: 
- Transaction deposits (nominal value 
guaranteed, no returns) 
- Investment deposits (nominal value not 
guaranteed, PLS) 
1. Two-tier mudarabah 
- Mudarabah financing (PLS) 
2. One-tier mudarabah 
- Musharakah financing (PLS) 
- Murabahah (mark-up) 
- Ijarah (mark-up) 
- Salam (mark-up) 
- Al-Istisna (mark-up) 
 
Qard al-Hasanah (benevolent loans) 
 
On the asset side, the bank acts as an investor in numerous public and private projects. The bank 
hereby acts as the capital owner investing the money of its depositors in a project. These 
investments are managed by the entrepreneur, who does not invest his own money in the 
project. The profits of the enterprise are shared between the partners at an agreed ratio. In case 
of losses, the bank takes the total burden, while the entrepreneur loses his employment, and 
simply does not reap the benefits of his efforts. These types of investments are usually on a short 
term. The profits gained from these projects – after deducting the agent (wakil) costs of the bank 
– are redistributed among the depositors at a pre-agreed ratio. The ideal two-tiered mudarabah 
model thus involves profit-and-loss sharing at both the asset and liabilities side of the bank. By 
consequence, in the case of loss on investment, the losses are shared both by the bank and the 
depositors, which is rather unusual from a ‘conventional’ point of view. 
3.2 A One-tier Mudarabah Model in Combination with Profit-and-Loss Sharing (PLS) and 
Mark-up Products 
Although the two-tiered mudarabah is regarded as an ideal model of Islamic banking, it is in fact 
implemented by very few Islamic banks. This is mainly due to an array of issues surrounding the 
use of mudarabah on the asset side. For instance, since the PLS principle transfers a substantial 
share of the risk to the Islamic bank, the screening costs and the monitoring of investments are 
generally higher. In addition, the fact that profits are shared between the bank and the money 
lender implies that a moral hazard problem can arise, since the lender can take a share of the 
profits before the PLS mechanism is started. Generally then, a one-tier mudarabah system on the 
liability side is combined with a broad range of financial products on the asset side (see Iqbal 
and Molyneux, 2005: 19-26). While musharakah is equally based on PLS, the lion’s share is based 
on mark-up principles (murabahah, ijarah, salam, and al-istisna). Musharakah is the only PLS 
alternative to mudarabah and can be compared to a joint enterprise in conventional terms. 
Whereas mudarabah implies that the bank is passive partner, here the bank takes an active 
management role.  
Most of the Islamic products, however, are based on mark-up, while mudarabah and 
musharakah represent only a small percentage (ca. 5%, see Pollard and Samers, 2007: 315) of 
financing by Islamic banks. One of the most common mark-up products is murabahah. The 
standard procedure involves the bank buying a commodity for the client, which is then sold to 
the client at a higher price. This actually reflects a deferred payment at a prefixed price, where 
the amount is paid in a lump sum or in instalments. This contract seems to have a lot in common 
with a conventional loan at a fixed interest rate. The difference, from the banks point of view, is 
that it is not making money with money, but that it is being rewarded for the services provided 
and risks run.  
Another mark-up product is ijarah, which is comparable to conventional leasing products. 
Further, salam and al-istisna are the most common mark-up products in trade financing. While 
in both cases the delivery is deferred, al-istisna can also defer the actual payment, provided it 
was fixed at the time of contracting. In these trade contracts, the commodities or services must 
be delivered to make the contract be Shari’a compliant. Otherwise a situation of futures trading 
can emerge, while the trade in financial derivates is mostly considered as unlawfully (Goldberg, 
2004). 
3.3 Qard al-Hasanah 
Perhaps the most surprising mode of financing from a conventional perspective is finance 
through benevolent loans. The so-called qard al-hasanah are provided by the bank without the 
obligation of paying for the loan. The initial capital must be returned, but no extra fee is charged.  
However, if the enterprise turns out to be fruitful, the client may decide to pay the bank a 
reward for the loan he or she received. (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005) 
3.4 Islamic insurance: takaful 
Apart from the above-mentioned banking services, Islamic insurance has gained enormous 
popularity in the last few years. Takaful, literally ‘guaranteeing each other’, forms the basis of 
Islamic insurance (Bekkin, 2007b: 109). Apart from the excessive risks induced by gharar and 
maysir, there is always the possibility that natural disasters and calamities occur. Since the latter 
cannot be avoided insurance is considered a good thing since it gives people the means to 
protect themselves against these uncertainties. However, insurance cannot be organized 
through ‘conventional’ insurance companies as they are reinvesting premiums on an interest 
basis, which of course conflicts with the Islamic perspective on riba. In answer to these 
restraints, Islamic insurance companies offer takaful insurance, which are very much organized 
like ‘conventional’ mutual insurance funds (see Bekkin, 2007b). Takaful is set up as a communal 
fund made up of the contributions of all participants. All claims are paid from this fund, so the 
risks are borne collectively. The takaful fund is based on the mudarabah principle, so any 
surpluses at the end of a term are divided among the participants at a pre-agreed profit-sharing 
ratio. However, in the case of shortages, the participants are expected to pay an additional 
premium.  
 
4 The geography of Islamic financial services 
While the previous section has discussed the retail side of the IFS sector, this section focuses on 
the observation that the IFS sector is increasingly ’going global’. This section therefore provides 
a brief overview of the IFS sector, focusing on both the geographical distribution of Shari’a 
compliant assets and the location of the top firms in the business. Since the IFS sector has 
evolved from a distinct Islamic economic rationale that originated in the Muslim world, the 
biggest part of the 639 billion US$ Shari’a compliant assets is evidently located in the Middle 
East, mainly in the field of retail services to Muslim customers. However, IFS firms are 
increasingly ‘going global’, offering their products to customers in non-Muslim countries in 
Europe and North America. In addition to the growing retail side, a wholesale secondary market 
in Islamic asset-backed securities is starting to flourish within the Gulf region, absorbing excess 
liquidity into real estate and major infrastructure projects. These mega projects are increasingly 
financed through tradable sukūk, an evolution that clears the horizon for a regional or even 
global Islamic secondary market.  
 
First, to get an idea about the basic geography of the globalized IFS sector, Table 2 provides an 
overview of the spatial distribution of Shari’a compliant assets, both globally and within the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Based on a listing of 500 Islamic financial institutions (The 
Banker, 2008), it can be seen that the biggest share (ca. 41%) of the worlds Shari’a compliant 
assets is located in the GCC states, followed by the non-GCC MENA (Middle East North Africa) 
region, which hosts another 39%.  
 
Among the GCC states, Saudi Arabia is the undisputed leader with 35% of the GCC states’ share, 
followed by Kuwait (24,1%), the U.A.E. (18,7%), Bahrain (14,2%) and Qatar (8%). The 
importance of the GCC states is far from surprising since the initial rise of the IFS sector was 
closely linked to the presence of petrodollars, which were (and are) of course plentiful in the 
Gulf. Among the non-GCC states, Iran and Pakistan have intended to fully Islamize their 
economies, making all assets theoretically Shari’a compliant from the 1980s onwards (Khan and 
Mirakhor, 1990). In Iran the islamization of the entire banking system was closely related to the 
Islamic revolution in 1979. The process has proved to be successful since Iran alone accounts for 
about 235 billion US$ of Shari’a complaints assets (i.e. 100% of all Iranian assets5), almost as 
much as the GCC states in total and ca. 36,8% of the global total. In Pakistan, however, only a 
quarter (15 billion US$) of all financial assets was Shari’a compliant in 2007, while in 2008 this 
amount has further dropped to 6,3 billion US$. The Pakistani government seems to have shifted 
ideas onto the development of an Islamic financial sector parallel to the existing interest-based 
circuits (see Bekkin, 2007a: 123-4).  
 
Table 2 Geographical distribution of Shari’a compliant assets (based on The Banker, 2008: 22, 24) 
  Shari'a compliant assets (bn US$) Percentage of total 
World regions     
GCC 262,7 41,2 
Non-GCC MENA 247,6 38,9 
Asia 86,2 13,5 
Australia/Europe/N. America 34,5 5,4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,4 1,0 
Global TOTAL 638,3 100,0 
Within GCC     
Saudi Arabia 91,9 35,0 
Kuwait 63,3 24,1 
UAE 49,1 18,7 
Bahrain 37,3 14,2 
Qatar 21,0 8,0 
GCC TOTAL 262,7 100,0 
 
Second, to refine our level of analysis, we focus on the geographical location of the major players 
in the IFS sector. Table 3 provides a list of the 50 largest IFS firms that are located both within 
the Middle East and beyond. As Table 3 shows, the IFS sector is dominated by firms from the 
Middle East, mainly located in the GCC states and Iran. If one focuses on the top firms in terms of 
headquarters location, it appears that a relatively small number of cities plays a crucial role 
within these ‘core’ Shari’a compliant regions. Figure 2, which plots the headquarter locations of 
the top 100 IFS firms, shows that the IFS sector within the Middle East is indeed anchored in a 
small number of cities. Tehran has the largest headquarter presence with twelve top 100 firms6, 
but the lion’s share of these firms are non-listed government-owned institutions (e.g. the top 2 
firms Bank Melli and Bank Saderat). Within the GCC states, top cities such as Manama and 
Kuwait City are leading the way, followed by other regional centres such as Dubai, Doha, and 
Abu Dhabi. In contrast to the Iranian situation, the IFS sector in GCC states has a rather different 
character, since it is much more based on private capital, while a lot of the firms are listed on 
one or more stock exchanges. Moreover, while Iranian firms generally have a domestic 
character, targeting the national retail market, Manama and Dubai are turntables in a more 
global strategy, hereby connecting other cities – both inside and outside the Middle East – into 
Islamic markets (see Bassens et al., 2010).    
 
As Table 3 shows, the IFS sector is dominated by firms from the Middle East, mainly located in 
the GCC states and Iran. If one focuses on the top firms in terms of headquarters location, it 
appears that a relatively small number of cities plays a crucial role within these ‘core’ Shari’a 
compliant regions. Figure 2, which plots the headquarter locations of the top 100 IFS firms, 
shows that the IFS sector within the Middle East is indeed anchored in a small number of cities. 
Tehran has the largest headquarter presence with twelve top 100 firms6, but the lion’s share of 
these firms are non-listed government-owned institutions (e.g. the top 2 firms Bank Melli and 
Bank Saderat). Within the GCC states, top cities such as Manama and Kuwait City are leading the 
way, followed by other regional centres such as Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. In contrast to the 
Iranian situation, the IFS sector in GCC states has a rather different character, since it is much 
more based on private capital, while a lot of the firms are listed on one or more stock exchanges. 
Moreover, while Iranian firms generally have a domestic character, targeting the national retail 
market, Manama and Dubai are turntables in a more global strategy, hereby connecting other 
cities – both inside and outside the Middle East – into Islamic markets (see Bassens et al., 2010).   
 
Especially Manama, which has been known to be a regional offshore banking centre for some 
decades, is now increasingly aiming at becoming the regional hub for IFS (see Bassens et al., 
2010). Although Bahrain’s share in terms of Shari’a compliant assets is relatively small (see 
Table 2), its importance is illustrated by the presence of no less than fifteen headquarters of the 
top 100 IFS firms. Although these remain small in comparison to the Tehran-based firms, their 
presence coincides with crucial institutions such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Liquidity Management Centre (LMC), the 
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), and the Islamic International Rating Agency 
(IIRA) which share presence there. Furthermore, 10 of the 40 companies on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange are IFS firms, including top companies such as Al Baraka Banking Group, ABC Islamic 
and Ithmaar Bank. To develop Manama’s competitive Islamic edge, the Central Bank of Bahrain 
has introduced a regulatory framework for monitoring and supervision that reflects the specific 
needs and concepts of Islamic finance (ICMA Centre, 2008: 33).  
 
Dubai is also competing for its share. The Dubai Financial Market (DFM) is a key trading place 
for IFS firm’s stocks in the region, currently listing 13 IFS firms on a total of 63 companies. The 
emirate has also set up the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC), offering foreign 
investors an attractive fiscal and legal environment to set up their corporations. However, the 
Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX), which falls under the DIFC’s authority, appears 
unattractive for IFS firms. Only one IFS firm (i.e. Al Baraka Banking Group) is listed there, a 
situation which is likely due to the incompatibility of the common law based legal environment 
within the DIFC and the Shari’a orientation of the IFS firms (see Caballo, 2007). But still, IFS are 
highly important in the Dubai market, since 12 of the 42 current DIFX listings are sukūk, 
predominantly issued to finance major infrastructure projects. For instance, the semi-
governmental investment corporations Emaar and Nakheel are using sukūk to raise funds for 
their major real estate projects. These sukūk are Shari’a compliant asset-backed notes. A 
common securitization technique is to sell the assets to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and then 
to lease them back on an ijara basis (ICMA Centre, 2008: 55-6). The sukūk holders in turn 
receive periodic payments on a variable profit-and-loss sharing basis, instead of receiving a 
fixed interest rate. 
 
  
Table 1 The Top 50 IFS firms, with headquarters location and value of Shari’a-compliant assets (based on The 
Banker, 2008) 
Islamic Financial Institution HQ Shari’a compliant assets (million US$) 
Bank Melli Iran Tehran 48470 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait City 37178 
Al Rajhi Bank Riyadh 33348 
Bank Saderat Iran Tehran 32610 
Bank Mellat Tehran 32534 
Bank Tejarat Tehran 26340 
Bank Sepah Tehran 24142 
Dubai Islamic Bank Dubai 22802 
Bank Keshavarzi (Agri.bank) Tehran 16298 
HSBC Amanah London 15194 
Parsian Bank Tehran 15117 
Bank Maskan Tehran 13075 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Abu Dhabi 12063 
Al Baraka Banking Group Manama 11166 
Bank Rakyat Kuala Lumpur 10397 
Maybank Islamic Berhad Kuala Lumpur 7755 
BIMB Holdings (Bank Islam Malaysia Bd) Kuala Lumpur 6596 
Pasargad Bank Tehran 6169 
Asya Finans Kurumu A.S. Istanbul 5873 
Qatar Islamic Bank Doha 5862 
Bank Refah Tehran 5787 
Bank Al Jazira Jeddah 5758 
Türkiye Finans Katilim Bankas A.fi. Istanbul 4703 
Investment Dar Kuwait City 4644 
Emirates Islamic Bank Dubai 4616 
Eghtesad Novin Bank Tehran 4501 
Bank Albilad Riyadh 4442 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bd Kuala Lumpur 4116 
Ithmaar Bank BSC Manama 4079 
QNB Al Islami Doha 3956 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt Cairo 3903 
Arcapita Bank BSC Manama 3806 
Bank Sanat Va Madaan Tehran 3792 
Gulf Finance House BSC Manama 3508 
Kuwait International Bank Kuwait City 3269 
Albarakah Turk Istanbul 3112 
Dubai Bank Dubai 2973 
AmIslamic Bank Bd Kuala Lumpur 2833 
Masraf Al Rayan Doha 2800 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Dhaka 2788 
International Leasing and Investment Company Kuwait City 2784 
Qatar International Islamic Bank Doha 2734 
Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam Berhad Bandar Seri Begawan 2723 
Sharjah Islamic Bank Sharjah 2722 
Bank Boubyan Kuwait City 2701 
CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad Kuala Lumpur 2678 
RHB Islamic Bank Bd Kuala Lumpur 2606 
Tamweel Dubai 2318 
Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance and Invt. Amman 2243 
Kuwait Turket Evcaf Finance House Ankara 2095 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Top IFS centers: cities are presented on an HQ index, representing the aggregate of the HQ presence 
of the top 100 IFS firms (based on The Banker, 2007), weighted by asset value. 
Outside the Middle East, Malaysia is the leader in terms of Shari’a compliance, holding 
approximately 67 billion US$ of Shari’a compliant assets. Malaysia currently pursues a pro-
active policy towards the IFS sector, especially encouraging takaful services throughout the 
country via tax breaks and other deregulatory measures already outlined in the Takaful Act of 
1984 (see Bekkin, 2007a: 127). According to the IMF (2007), Malaysia also hosts the largest 
sukūk market, estimated at 47 billion US$ in 2007, which accounts for about two thirds of the 
global Islamic bonds outstanding and represents the largest market in terms of outstanding size 
and number of issues. In 2008, the central bank estimated the sukūk market already at 100 
billion US$, which is illustrative for its tremendous growth and popularity in Malaysia. In 
addition, in 2008, the 843 Shari’a compliant stocks accounted for 85% of the stocks listed in the 
domestic stock exchange (Reuters, 2008). The success of the IFS market is certainly a result of 
the supportive role of the Malaysian authorities. For instance, the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-
2010) aims at strengthening Malaysia’s position as a global IFS hub, as a centre for origination, 
distribution, trading, fund, and wealth management (IMF, 2007). By making the country a global 
Islamic brand, Malaysia is also trying to tap liquidity from the Gulf States. Evidently, much of this 
Islamic ‘buzz’ is located in Kuala Lumpur, which is home to ten of the top 100 IFS firms, but also 
to the Islamic Financial Services Board, an international standard-setting institution for Islamic 
finance. Simultaneously, the Malaysian offshore centre Labuan is developing IFS as a niche 
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market to avoid competitive outbidding from other offshore financial centres (Abbott, 1999: 
197, 208). 
 
But also in non-Muslim countries, the IFS sector is now gaining momentum (see Bassens et al., 
2010). IFS firms are present either through branch offices (e.g., Faisal Private Bank in Geneva, a 
subsidiary of the Manama-based Ithmaar Bank) or newly established full-fledged Islamic 
financial institutions (e.g., the Islamic Bank of Britain). Additionally, conventional financial 
institutions have opened Islamic ‘windows’ to cater to the local Muslim population (e.g. HSBC 
through its subsidiary HSBC Amanah). Other conventional banks such as Fortis Bank, Barclays, 
Deutsche Bank have not yet taken the step of opening up Islamic windows, but are slowly 
introducing some Islamic products (Shari’a compliant funds) into Western markets. Both in 
Europe and the USA Shari’a compliant products (mainly murabahah mortgages) are available on 
retail level. However, in terms of wholesale finance, Europe clearly has the upper hand with 
London and to a lesser extent Paris as IFS hubs on the rise. The fact that IFS developments in the 
USA are lagging behind is no doubt related to the more tense relations with the Middle East after 
the events of 9/11 and the chain of events that was triggered in the aftermath.  Notwithstanding 
New York’s policy efforts in these markets and the influence of the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Indexes, London is becoming the key player outside the Muslim world in the global Shari’a 
compliant market. As was the case for the Eurobond market a few decades ago, the London is 
again trying to become an ‘entrepot’ for global capital (ICMA Centre, 2008: 69), this time turning 
to IFS to get a share of the Gulf its excess liquidity. On a retail level, the UK Government has 
already made a number of legal adaptations such as the elimination of double stamp tax, which 
previously limited the attractiveness of Islamic mortgages. Most of these mortgages are 
structured according to the murabahah model. Unlike a conventional loan where the customer 
immediately becomes the owner of the commodity, the murabahah model implies a double 
ownership transfer: the first transfer occurs when the bank buys the commodity (e.g. a house) 
for the customer, followed by a second transfer when the last instalment is paid to the bank. 
Nowadays, thanks to legal adaptations, the double ownership transfer no longer leads to double 
taxation, enhancing the competitiveness of Islamic mortgages in the UK market. On the 
wholesale level, in order to channel the Gulf’s Shari’a compliant investments through the City, 
the UK government is considering the issuance of government securities in sterling in sukūk 
form, which would provide a basis for active trading and for pricing of corporate securities. This 
would not only enhance the price-setting of the latter, the established structure would also 
reduce the cost of the corporate issuance itself (ICMA Centre, 2008: 70-71).  
 
Seeing the progress London has made, Paris is anxious to attract some of the Gulf-based 
investments that are currently flowing to London. The Minister of Finance of France, Christine 
Lagarde, wants to offer a more accommodating legal and fiscal framework in France 
(Anonymous, 2008a). Although some IFS firms are already present (e.g. the Iranian Bank Melli 
and Bank Tejarat, the Bahraini ABC Islamic Bank), and the potential retail market is substantial 
and even bigger than in the UK, Paris is not (yet) a serious player in the global Shari’a compliant 
market.  
 
In addition to these European cities, a number of Asian financial centres such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo are also turning their attention to the IFS market, albeit that they stand in the 
shadow of the Islamic giant Kuala Lumpur. These international financial centres are hoping to 
play an important role in the emerging IFS sector just as well. Tokyo, for instance, has made 
clear that it is considering the launch of a sukūk through the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JBIC) (Anonymous, 2008b).  However, the rather closed character of the Japanese 
market makes it unlikely for Tokyo to become a global Islamic hub in the near future. Singapore 
is already a step further. The city has already developed a Shari’a compliant market, although it 
is still very small. According to the central bank, in 2007 Singapore had about 1.32 billion US$ of 
Shari’a compliant property funds and 500 million US$ of takaful funds (International Herald 
Tribune, 2007). In the case of Hong Kong, the IFS sector is still embryonic, seeing that only this 
year the first Islamic bank (Hong Leong Bank) has opened an Islamic window in the city. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Whereas the actual size of the Shari’a compliant market is still small in relative terms, the 
growth rate of the IFS sector and its huge potential Muslim costumer basis globally indicates 
that this could turn out to be a crucial evolution within the international financial markets. 
Especially within the Muslim world, the IFS sector is increasingly becoming the ‘appropriate’ 
way of banking, financing projects and getting insurance. At the same time, the developing retail 
market forms the basis for international Islamic markets, where Islamic bonds are being issued 
and traded in centres of which Manama, Dubai and Kuala Lumpur are prime examples.  
While the IFS sector is going global to cater to Muslim customers in both Muslim and non-
Muslim countries on a retail level, the wholesale Shari’a compliant markets are also attracting 
the interest of ‘conventional’ international financial centres worldwide such as London, New 
York, Singapore, etc. Given the high (albeit volatile) oil prices and the Islamic economic revival in 
the Middle East, these centres are gradually coming to realise that the capacity to attract 
investments from the Gulf will be a crucial factor in their overall competitiveness in the years to 
come. Indeed, under the conditions of the contemporary financial crisis, both the nature and the 
geography of the international financial market are likely to be reshaped intensely (Taylor et al., 
2009). Given its steep rise and popularity, the IFS sector may very well be the vanguard of a next 
generation of globalization, where international financial markets are organized both more 
ethically and perhaps more cautiously. 
Notes 
1. The Muslim World is here defined as the geographical region that comprises all 
countries with a Muslim majority, stretching from North Africa, over the Greater Middle 
East to South-East Asia. 
2. The Dubai Islamic bank, the first private interest-free bank, was set up in 1975 (Zaher 
and Hassan 2001: 169). 
3. As a reference: On July 21st, 2008, the KBC Group, the third largest Belgium-based and 
38th ranked bank worldwide, alone had an asset value of about 517 billion US$ (see 
Fortune, 2008). 
4. The hadiths are a collection of written down traditions, concerning the actions and 
sayings of the Prophet Mohammed. 
5. However, as Bekkin (2007b: 124) has pointed out, this percentage is merely theoretic, as 
the Iranian economy knows the use of interest-based modes of finance (e.g. Eurobonds) 
as well.   
6. The top 100 full-fledged IFS firms were selected from The Banker’s Top 500 Islamic 
Financial Institutions (November 2007 supplement). 
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